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Given Today’s New Wave of Protectionism,
is Antitrust Law the Last Hope for Preserving
a Free Global Economy or Another Nail in
Free Trade’s Coffin?
BY ALLISON MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION
Trump. Le Pen. Brexit. Protectionist rhetoric has consumed the
international political stage. Western countries and their leaders were
once the drivers of economic globalization, relying on free-market
speeches and the prospect of removing trade barriers to appeal to their
constituents.1 They pointed fingers at other countries engaging in or
encouraging protectionist behavior and challenged them in the court of
public opinion and elsewhere to stop their antics. The “our country first,
world trade after” mentality was widely politicized and vilified. Now, it
seems that Western national leaders are championing the very
protectionism that they once criticized.2
Although a system of truly free world trade has never been
perfected, past world leaders have eliminated most of the protectionist
trade mechanisms that once ran rampant in the international economy.
They did so by implementing multilateral and bilateral trade agreements.
These webs of agreements have bolstered decades of support for free
trade, or at least some version of it. By and large, tariff policies and other
forms of protectionism were either eliminated or dramatically reduced.
* Allison Murray, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Juris Doctor, May 2019. Special thanks to
Professor David Kesselman and to the ILR team of editors and staff.
1. See JEFFREY L. CHIDESTER & PAUL KENGOR, REAGAN’S LEGACY IN A WORLD
TRANSFORMED 12-13, 23 (2015).
2. Robert Plummer, Protectionism: Is it on the way back?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18104024.
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Now, as we have seen in the media, when a government imposes a tariff,
it becomes a rather extreme political statement which sends a shockwave
of significant global consequences.
Protectionism did not end when the age of overbearing tariff policies
did, despite then-leaders’ best efforts to vilify it. Rather, the end of the
tariff era forced nations to achieve protectionist goals through more subtle
trade vehicles, like antitrust law.3 So, the recent resurgence of
protectionist rhetoric should mean that these subtle trade vehicles,
including antitrust law, will be relied on more heavily. It is a fear of many
that antitrust law may become overused and inequitably applied to
achieve and combat protectionist aims.
Notwithstanding the recent uptick in tariff threats, it is unlikely that
all Western leaders will revamp or terminate the trade agreements set
forth by their predecessors and bring back the kinds of tariff policies that
once existed in their place. Although in the United States (“U.S.”),
President Trump recently imposed tariffs on steel imports, it appears that
his intent is to limit this behavior to a specific industry rather than institute
a widespread policy favoring the use of tariffs generally.4 To remedy bad
behavior in a specialized set of industries is not to instigate a global
paradigm shift. This purpose is underscored by his use of the national
security exemption, which is largely interpreted as being used for
individual situations rather than general policy schemes.5 Many still hope
that his course of action will be retracted and is merely a strong
negotiation tactic. However, there is no doubt that Trump is far more
comfortable than past leaders with subverting the status quo on trade
relations.
Trump is not the only high-profile leader flirting with staunch
protectionism. Western leaders in the E.U. appear to be growing more
comfortable than their predecessors with considering similar policies.
However, Western lawmakers themselves do not seem as persuaded by
the statements of their leadership. The general sentiment among
international policymakers is that there has been too much political
wherewithal spent on loosening international trade barriers to take actions

3. See Anu Bradford, Robert J. Jackson & Jonathon Zytnick, Is EU Antitrust Enforcement a
Tool for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165 (2018).
4. See Pete Kasperowicz, How Trump’s Steel Tariffs Could Break the WTO, WASH.
EXAMINER (Mar. 6, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/how-trumps-steeltariffs-could-break-the-wto/article/2650771; Ana Swanson, Trump to Impose Sweeping Steel and
Aluminum Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business
/trump-tariffs.html.
5. See Swanson, supra note 4; Kasperowicz, supra note 4.
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that could counteract that progress.6 Presidential actions taken because of
dissatisfaction with current global trade relations aside, a complete
overhaul of trade agreements may be too daunting and difficult a task,
especially absent ample political support in legislative bodies.
Given the anticipated continuation of cooperative trade agreements
and the proliferation of protectionist rhetoric as the new norm of public
opinion, leaders will be forced to rely on existing avenues to meet
protectionist aims. Again, we find ourselves relying squarely on antitrust
law, the more subtle and widely accepted mechanism of restricting trade,
to address perceived inequities. In the words of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), “once formal trade barriers come down, other
issues become more important.”7 Among the important issues lies
antitrust law. Antitrust and competition laws can form a subtle trade
barrier resulting in the imposition of tariff-like measures.
Antitrust law can be enforced to reach protectionist aims and to
combat them. It is a tool that allows nations to achieve individual
protectionist aims without undermining the future of trade between
countries and the cooperative framework underpinning the relatively
delicate global free trade enjoyed today. However, the perception of
enforcement of antitrust laws as an abusive and solely protectionist
mechanism may cause the death of even the smallest semblance of
international free trade that remains in the international marketplace
today.
This paper explores how the near-term enforcement of antitrust and
competition laws may be either the last hope for preserving aims toward
a free global economy or the final nail in free trade’s coffin. We will begin
by examining the background of antitrust and competition laws,
explaining the goals and economic theories at the heart of the laws,
including the myriad of criticisms. Next, we will take a general view of
the prevalence of competition laws in the world market, revealing the
differences in underlying theory and enforcement by the top three players
on the international trade stage. This paper will finish with the subject
most at the center of the recent rise of protectionist rhetoric: the
perception of unfair enforcement of antitrust laws among the United
States, the European Union, and China.

6. See Swanson, supra note 4; Kasperowicz, supra note 4.
7. Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler Procedures, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).
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I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW
It is no great revelation that trade has become increasingly global.
However, it is nowhere near the true, theoretical conception of free trade
contemplated by economic theorists. In that world of perfect free trade,
businesses would “enter and exit markets instantly and without cost,” no
single firm would be “large enough to influence prices by altering
output,” and any business that “tried to charge more than its costs would
be undercut by another [competitor].”8 The efficiency of this perfectly
competitive environment would know no borders and require no
government enforcement.
Of course, such a perfect world does not exist. Firms can become
large enough to influence output and prices, businesses can collude
amongst themselves to edge out a new market entrant, and the firms
engaging in these business practices could suffer no or minimal
repercussions from the market.9 “A market is not politically neutral; its
existence creates economic power which one actor can use against
another.”10
The economic inefficiencies that plague the real world have caused
national lawmakers, especially those in less developed economies, to
pursue nationalist policies to protect their national industries.11 These
“economic nationalists . . . frequently regard trade negatively, believing
it to be destructive of traditional values.”12 They recognize that under
reasonably certain circumstances, namely where large economies and
monopolists can exploit their market positions, free and unregulated trade
may actually be more harmful than beneficial.13
To protect their national markets from such realities, lawmakers
adopt antitrust laws. These laws serve to promote and preserve fair
competition in an otherwise free market.14 They “ensure that the market
is free to allocate resources in response to demand . . . free from restraints
imposed by private parties.”15 Without such private “restraints,”
resources are certain to be allocated more efficiently by maximizing
8. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1
(Hart Publ’g 2d ed. 2011).
9. Id. at 4.
10. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23 (1987).
11. Id. at 113.
12. Id. at 172.
13. Id. at 179.
14. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism:
The Need for Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 394 (1994).
15. Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust, and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences and Relationships,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1995).
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aggregate national wealth,16 while still providing nations with some
control and protection from firms engaging in foul play. This adoption of
antitrust law was long regarded as a solution that enabled the best of both
worlds; it was thought to be a win-win for nations wanting to compete on
the international economic stage without giving up their sovereign ability
to penalize those that attempt to take advantage of such an open economic
market.17
The formation and enforcement of national antitrust laws has
become a quite prominent trend internationally.18 Nearly all countries that
are, purport to be, or aim to be major players in the global economy have
adopted some form of domestic competition law. Since the 1890s, the
amount of “gross domestic product (“GDP”) in countries with antitrust
enforcement rose from less than 20 percent to over 95 percent.”19 Over
120 nations have adopted antitrust laws into their domestic legal systems,
and nearly 20% of these nations have adopted these laws in the last fifteen
years.20
II. CRITICISM OF ANTITRUST LAW
Although antitrust laws have been widely adopted, the laws are not
without criticism.
A. Ambiguity in the Laws
Many critics of antitrust law claim that the laws themselves are
“couched in vague, indefinable terms, permitting the Administration and
the courts to avoid defining in advance what a ‘monopolistic’ crime is
and what it is not.”21 These critics claim that antitrust laws rely on
“deliberate vagueness and ex-post facto rulings” rather than “clear
definitions . . . known in advance and discoverable by a jury after due
legal process,” which clearly calls into question their efficacy. 22 The
vagueness and lack of clear definitions for the concepts at issue in
antitrust law have caused significant discussion in academic circles:
Today, courts appear to be confused about whether market power
and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts . . . Supreme Court
16. Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 394.
17. Id.
18. See generally, Pierre Cremieux & Edward A. Snyder, Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws
Against Domestic and Foreign Firms, 59 J.L. & ECON. 775 (2016).
19. Id. at 777.
20. Id. at 776-78.
21. Murray N. Rothbard, Abolish Antitrust Laws, MISES INST. (May 25, 2010),
https://mises.org/library/abolish-antitrust-laws.
22. Id.
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opinions demonstrate a marked inconsistency as to whether market power
and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts. We can find no
Supreme Court opinion that contrasts the terms “market power” and
“monopoly power” deliberately and explicitly, i.e., that finds the
existence of one but not the other. . . . Other Supreme Court opinions also
appear to treat market power and monopoly power as identical concepts.
Despite these references, however, the Supreme Court, in other
cases, seems to have articulated standards for “monopoly power” and
“market power” that, at least linguistically, are incompatible. In NCAA v.
Board of Regents, the Court defined “market power” as “the ability to
raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.”
By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently defined “monopoly
power,” at least for section two cases, in accordance with the definition
articulated in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.—i.e., as
“the power to control prices or exclude competition.” Strictly construed,
the Court’s language appears to require a higher burden of proof to
establish “market power” than to demonstrate “monopoly power,”
because proof of a defendant’s ability to exclude competition would not
suffice to demonstrate the existence of “market power.”23
The varied and unpredictable scope of what constitutes a “market”
is perhaps the clearest example that critics use to highlight antitrust law
as muddied and inconsistent. Market definitions are suggested by the
parties to the proceedings and are presumably skewed toward whatever
position the suggesting party takes in the dispute. The court either adopts
one of these definitions or, if entirely unpersuaded, creates a new one that
is more fitting to the situation at hand. Often, the court receives criticism
for using too narrow or too broad of a definition.24 Most importantly,
while the court requires some rationale behind the definitions proposed
by the parties, there is no preset or standard for the scope of market
definitions.
This largely affects the landscape of antitrust law because whatever
market definition is adopted by the court can substantially affect the
court’s findings. For example, the European Union (“E.U.”), in a recent
investigation of Google, claimed that Google had dominated the market
and abused fair competition laws.25 The E.U. authorities defined the

23. Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Lande & Steven Salop, Monopoly Power and Market
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 246-47 (1987) (footnotes and citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protecting Competition or Competitors? – Europe’s Pursuit of
Silicon Valley, OPEN POLITICAL ECON. NETWORK: BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016), http://
www.opennetwork.net/protecting-competition/.
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relevant product market as the Android operating system.26 Naturally,
because the operating system was considered “its own market” and
Google obtained control over 100% of the operating system, the court
found that Google maintained a monopoly. 27 Had that relevant product
market been characterized by the court more broadly, perhaps as cell
phone operating systems or as online shopping forums, Google probably
would not have been found to have the requisite market control required
to be a monopolist.28 That ruling, as with many cases, hinged entirely on
the scope of the market definition being applied, leaving behind the
uncertainty that had the market definition been broader, the court perhaps
would have ruled the opposite way.
B. Antitrust’s Competing Goals
Especially in the U.S., a criticism of antitrust is that the goal of
preserving competition in economic markets, the most intuitive and
obvious goal of enacting competition laws, has taken a backseat to a
different goal set by the legislature: consumer protection.29 It is argued
that the introduction of a consumer welfare standard has led to
inconsistent enforcement, as it is a contradictory goal to preserving
competition.30
At some level, consumer protection and preservation of competition
through antitrust laws appear to have consistent effects. Economists and
laypersons alike seem to understand the concept that “monopolies lead to
high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many
sellers drives prices down.”31 It is a matter of basic supply and demand.
As low prices are beneficial to consumers, why wouldn’t consumers be
inherently protected by laws preserving a larger supply and more
competitors? As with many economic concepts that rely on unattainably
perfect rational behaviors, there are real-world exceptions.
There are many sets of circumstances in which the application of
antitrust laws to preserve competition in the market may actually hurt

26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Surely, we can think of various other companies—Apple, Amazon—who are equally if
not more dominant than Google in the “cell phone operating systems” or “online shopping”
markets.
29. See generally Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV 2253
(2013).
30. See generally id.
31. Id. at 2263.
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consumers.32 Among these circumstances are the following: (1) the
maintenance of “low prices for ‘bads,’”33 a term for products that are
deemed to have negative consequences on society, like tobacco; (2) “low
prices for status goods”;34 and (3) “the pursuit for innovation in durables
and fashion goods.”35 After all, a consumer could benefit from a large
company lowering its prices, regardless of whether the company’s
purpose in doing so is to undercut the competition and force its competing
businesses out of the market.36 That company is clearly utilizing an
anticompetitive and monopolistic tactic, but the lowered price would
benefit the consumer. Advocates of antitrust laws assume that the next
course of action for a monopolist would be to increase its prices to the
detriment of its consumers once the company is the only provider of its
product, but it is possible that a company would not elect that course of
action. It is possible, although improbable, that the consumer in this
scenario would never be harmed by the company’s anticompetitive
conduct, therefore making consumers better off without the intervention
of antitrust laws.
U.S. antitrust laws at least purport to concern themselves with longterm competition in the market rather than short-term consumer benefit.
However, recent case law suggests that even calling “preservation of
long-term competition” the goal of the law is debatable. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. ruled that “predatory price cutting is not unlawful unless the
predator has a reasonable prospect of recouping his investment from
supracompetitive profits.”37 This ruling insulated certain kinds of
anticompetitive behavior so long as the behavior does not result in a
reasonable possibility of harm to consumers. While the ruling attempted
to address the above example, to many, the Court appeared to be
struggling to maintain a balance between preserving competition and
protecting consumers, which solidifies the criticism that consumer
protection, a concept that can be at direct odds with perfect competition,
is treated as one of the dual aims of the law itself.
32. Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
133, 151 (2010).
33. The reference to “bads” describes products that the author deems to be bad for society,
e.g., tobacco. The argument here is that low prices for bad products encourage consumers to
purchase the products, even though they may ultimately be unhealthy or harmful to consumers. See
Orbach, supra note 32, at 151.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Donald J. Boudreaux & Thomas J. Dilorenzo, The Protectionist Roots of Antitrust, 6 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 81, 83 (1993).
37. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 254 (1993).
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C. Antitrust: Isn’t It Just Protectionism on its Face?
Closer to the critical point of this paper, another popular criticism of
antitrust law is that the laws themselves are inherently protectionist.38
Trade protectionism is a “theory, practice, or system of fostering or
developing domestic industries by protecting them from foreign
competition.”39 Protectionism is “a politically motivated defensive
measure.”40 Economics experts agree that “in the short run, it works. But,
it is very destructive in the long term.”41 While preserving the country’s
competitive abilities for a short period, protectionism eventually makes
the country engaged in protectionist policies and its industries “less
competitive in international trade.”42 The more inward a country focuses,
the more coddled and inefficient its markets and domestic companies
become. In addition, surrounding countries will retaliate with
protectionist policies, further thwarting the efficiencies gained from a free
trade economy and its attendant benefits like downward price pressure
and availability of goods for consumers.
Protectionist trade measures characteristically include tariffs,
subsidies, quotas, and currency valuation activities.43 In the U.S.,
economists have argued that the Great Depression of the 1930s was
deepened by the highly protectionist policies. During that time, the U.S.
maintained the largest tariff rates of that century. 44 They were intended to
prop up the national industries that were struggling in light of the
country’s poor economic health.45 Counterintuitive as it was, the very
policies implemented to battle the poor national economy and to retain
domestic jobs appeared to worsen the problem.46
38. Boudreaux & Dilorenzo, supra note 36, at 93.
39. Protectionism, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/protectionism (last
visited Sept. 7, 2018).
40. Kimberly Amadeo, Trade Protectionism and Its Methods with Examples, Pros and Cons,
THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896 (last updated
Jul. 31, 2018).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id; see also Arye L. Hillman, Protectionist Policies as the Regulations of International
Industry, 67 PUB. CHOICE 101, 103 (1990).
44. See Sarah Gardner & Scott Tong, The American Protectionism Bill that Made the Great
Depression Worse, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.marketplace.org
/2017/08/24/sustainability/trade-stories-globalization-and-backlash/what-was-one-worst-piecesus-legislation; Bruce Bartlett, The Truth about Trade in History, CATO INSTIT.: COMMENT. (July
1, 1998) https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/truth-about-trade-history.
45. Martin Armstrong, Did Tariffs Cause the Great Depression?, ARMSTRONG ECON.: BLOG
(July 9, 2018), https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/sovereign-debt-crisis/didtariffs-cause-great-depression/.
46. See Bartlett, supra note 44.
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Critics of antitrust law contend that protectionism was the main
reason behind the creation of antitrust laws. In the U.S., small farmers
were being underpriced by larger, more efficient farms.47 Antitrust laws
were enacted to protect those underperforming farmers from the lowerpriced competitors.48 Critics claim that the antitrust laws artificially
stunted the market efficiency of the larger firms and, presumably, the
technological advances that such efficiency would have driven in the
markets, and thereby stunted the true value of competition rather than
promoting it.49
These critics appear to greatly oversimplify the issues. It is true that
antitrust laws do superficially disrupt the market, like any form of
regulation would, despite their avowed purpose to avoid market
disruptions. Antitrust enforcement can and does thwart the market
efficiency the laws intend to promote. However, by protecting
competition, sometimes in the form of propping up inefficient
competitors, it ensures that market power is not concentrated in any one
actor. In doing so, it ensures that market power cannot be abused by any
one actor. The societal goals of avoiding this kind of market abuse can be
viewed as protectionist. But, are not all laws inherently protectionist in
some manner? Perhaps not in the sense that they favor domestic firms
over foreign ones, but surely in the sense that they intend to serve as
protection for whatever the scope of regulation pertains to—here, the
markets.
A further criticism of competition law’s protectionist roots is that
“competition law might—especially through selective, discriminatory
enforcement—be abused as a trade barrier.”50 That is true, and further to
the point of this paper, it may become more likely given the recent
political climate. However, shouldn’t we be wary of a world without such
protections? The fact that a law can be abused does not eliminate the need
for that law altogether. Antitrust law is but a tool that can be wielded to
support either free trade or protectionist aims.51 It depends entirely on
those with the power to enforce and evaluate antitrust claims.
Despite the protectionist roots of antitrust laws, their preservation
has provided the opportunity for at least some version of free trade. The
protections afforded to countries through antitrust laws may be the only
47. See Boudreaux & Dilorenzo, supra note 36, at 83.
48. See id.
49. See Rothbard, supra note 21.
50. Tim Büthe, The Politics of Market Competition: Trade and Antitrust in a Global
Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
213, 215 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015).
51. See generally id.
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safeguards that provide these countries with the requisite peace of mind
to consider engaging in a global free trade market. One would think that
the pro-free trade, anti-protectionism critics of antitrust laws would value
some market distortion over the outright elimination of all free trade.52 Of
course, this assumes that the critics of protectionism would value any
course of action that results in some free trade over none.
D. Anti-Dumping: The Premier Protectionist Tool of Antitrust
Anti-dumping policies are the antitrust topic that receives the most
frequent and stark criticism. Anti-dumping policies allow governments to
“impose duties [(e.g., fines on a company)] whenever goods are sold in
export markets at less than their fair [(e.g., market)] value.”53 The policies
are intended to “prevent firms from price discriminating between
markets,” especially national ones.54 Similar to the above protectionist
arguments about antitrust laws on the whole, critics often argue that
antidumping laws “induce more distortions in the market than they
resolve.”55
What sets antidumping apart from the rest of antitrust policy? Why
is antidumping a riper target for criticism? Although all competition laws
address market distortions, anti-dumping is the only measure among them
that does not merely act to eliminate anti-competitive behavior of a firm;
rather, anti-dumping is punitive in nature.56 A successful antidumping
claim results in relief that is more severe than a mere injunction or making
the injured party whole.57 Anti-dumping cases result in the imposition of
fines and high tariffs on the anticompetitive party, even to the extent that
the fines or tariffs dramatically affect the party’s ability to continue its
current and future business dealings.58 For this reason, certain countries,
like Japan, share the view that anti-dumping measures are the most easily
abused antitrust tool and a great threat to the preservation of free market
competition.59
52. See id. at 220.
53. Ian Wooton & Maurizio Zanardi, Anti-Dumping Versus Anti-Trust: Trade and
Competition Policy, in II HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS 383, 384 (E Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan
eds., 2002).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 390.
57. See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc, WTO (Sept. 15,
2018), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm.
58. See Elizabeth L. Gunn, Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost
Redistribution in Antidumping Cases, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 176 (2005).
59. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 394.
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Anti-dumping legislation gained popularity after the Second World
War, perhaps unsurprisingly coinciding with the declining popularity and
use of tariffs.60 Today, over ninety countries have adopted anti-dumping
laws; nearly every country that has antitrust laws has anti-dumping laws
as well.61 Some experts argue that trade liberalization and anti-dumping
laws have spurred the rise of anti-dumping measures. These experts point
to agreements that have eliminated trade tariffs as the cause of these
adoptive anti-dumping measures.62 See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Average tariffs and definitive AD measures for non-traditional users
(Source: Wooton & Zanardi)63

Even against the “we want free trade” public backdrop of the 1980s
and 1990s, countries attempted to protect themselves from overt anticompetitive behavior, like price dumping.64 Any alternative risked losing
public support for trade liberalization at the first sign of abuse in the
market.65 One can imagine the public outcry that would ensue if a country
was unable to respond to anticompetitive behavior. Even the U.S., which
had traditionally been a staunch advocate for free trade, “imposed more
than 600 antidumping measures and nearly 300 anti-subsidy duties since

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 385.
See id. at 386.
See id. at 384.
Id. at 390.
See id. at 391.
See id. at 387.
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1980,” each of which were “aimed at correcting what the U.S.
government deemed to be unfair trade.”66
A key criticism of anti-dumping policy is that it is used
inconsistently to serve special political interests.67 In the U.S., steel is an
“emblem of [the] country’s descent from greatness.”68 American
steelmakers have lobbied for decades to preserve and protect the domestic
industry.69 Today, the U.S. makes “half as much as 50 years ago and
employs just a third of the workers.”70 Past U.S. Presidents made it part
of their political platforms to initiate trade policies that would limit the
importation of competing steel products, especially from Europe and
Japan.71 The Trump Administration appears to be no exception. Although
Trump recently resorted to imposing tariffs, he first used anti-dumping
measures to protect the American steel industry. 72
The first trade case brought by the U.S. government during the
Trump Administration was an anti-dumping case alleging that producers
from other countries (Brazil, Norway, and Australia) deliberately sold
silicon metal (a raw material required to produce steel) “at artificially low
prices in the U.S.”73 The alleged dumping margins were 134.9%, 45.7%,
and 52.8% respectively.74 After an affirmative ruling in favor of the U.S.
in October of 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) made
final affirmative determinations in February of 2018.75
Additionally, on November 28, 2017, the DOC self-initiated an antidumping case against China alleging that China exported common alloy
aluminum sheets at a low price in order to materially injure the domestic

66. Kasperowicz, supra note 4.
67. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 218.
68. Protection American Steel from imports makes no sense, THE ECONOMIST (Apr 27, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21721413-far-saving-jobs-it-willdestroy-them-protecting-american-steel-imports.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See Kasperowicz, supra note 4.
73. Globe Specialty Metals Files Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Actions Against
Brazil, Kazakhstan, Norway, and Australia, GLOBE NEWS WIRE (Mar 08, 2017, 11:52 AM),
https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/03/08/933518/0/en/Globe-Specialty-Metals-FilesAntidumping-and-Countervailing-Duty-Actions-Against-Brazil-Kazakhstan-Norway-andAustralia.html.
74. Id.
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Issues
Affirmative Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations of Silicon Metal from Australia, Brazil
and Norway (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/usdepartment-commerce-issues-affirmative-preliminary-antidumping-duty.
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industry for that product in the U.S.76 This self-initiation is highly unusual
and has not been done in more than twenty-five years.77 In its initial
evaluation, the U.S. estimated that the illegal prices being set were
between 48 to 100 percent less than the fair market value.78
These are only a few examples of antidumping cases that have
affected the darlings of American industry. According to the DOC,
“enforcement of U.S. trade law is a prime focus of the Trump
administration. From January 20, 2017, through February 26, 2018, the
Department of Commerce initiated 102 antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations—a 96% increase from 52 in the previous period. The
Commerce Department currently maintains 424 antidumping and
countervailing duty orders which provide relief to American companies
and industries impacted by unfair trade.”79
Of course, the hope remains that the U.S. process continues to be
impartial and unmoved by political interests. Fairness is an integral part
of our justice system and serves as the cornerstone justification for the
imposition of otherwise unacceptable tariffs on foreign parties. However,
such need for impartiality (in perception or otherwise) has not dissuaded
special interest groups and political figures from publicly lobbying the
U.S. Government to make certain rulings. As to the self-initiated case
against China referenced above, Congressmen, CEOs, labor union
leaders, and other politically powerful individuals created a spectacle of
their public lobbying efforts, citing the importance of “protecting” the
U.S. constituents from “trade practices . . . threatening U.S. jobs.”80
The perception that the law is susceptible to manipulation based on
special political interests is partly what made Boeing’s 2017 filings
against Bombardier for anti-dumping violations, and the preliminary
findings of the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in favor of
76. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Self-Initiates
Historic Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet
From China (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/11/usdepartment-commerce-self-initiates-historic-antidumping-and.
77. Alex Lawson, US Triggers New China Trade Case with Rare Maneuver, LAW 360 (Nov.
28, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/989055/us-triggers-new-china-trade-casewith-rare-maneuver.
78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Finds Dumping
and Subsidization of Imports of Aluminum Foil from the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 27,
2018), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/02/us-department-commerce-findsdumping-and-subsidization-imports-aluminum.
79. See id.
80. Chris Veech, Rep. James Comer Says U.S. Aluminum Jobs in Jeopardy,
TRISTATEHOMEPAGE.COM
(Jan.
11,
2018,
11:23
AM),
http://www.tristatehomepage.com/news/local-news/rep-james-comer-says-us-aluminum-jobs-injeopardy/909831854.
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Boeing, so controversial.81 Essentially, Boeing brought an action against
Bombardier, a smaller competitor, alleging that Bombardier had been
offering passenger jet products at well below its own costs. 82 Boeing, a
U.S. company, was ridiculed in the press and accused of filing the suit
merely to obliterate a smaller foreign competitor’s growing foothold in a
product market where Boeing already had strong market power.83 Boeing
was perceived as a bully and a whiner, while Bombardier, the party
alleged to have engaged in the improper and anticompetitive conduct,
was portrayed as a victim.
The U.S. Government made its preliminary ruling that Bombardier
had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and recommended the
application of hefty duties (~300%) against Bombardier as punishment.84
The preliminary ruling suggested that Boeing was well within its rights
to bring the claim, despite being the larger and more powerful market
player. Even still, the international and domestic press toward Boeing and
the U.S. was pointedly negative. High profile national leaders, including
British Prime Minister Theresa May, threatened trade wars against the
U.S. and warned Boeing that continued action could jeopardize its
contracts.85 Ultimately, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(“USITC”) reversed its position and issued a decision against Boeing.86
The surprise ruling, which was contrary to their initial recommendation,
calls into question whether the USITC succumbed to the immense
political pressure surrounding the issue.87
Critiques aside, the benefit of anti-dumping policies is that they can
be effective even without a supranational system of power. Much like a
country’s standard trade tariff systems, the duties are imposed by that
country without requiring any coordination or cooperation from other
81. Benjamin Zhang, Boeing Scored a Big Victory Against its Canadian Rival, but it May
Start a Nasty Trade War., BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeingcommerce-department-bombardier-tariff-219-trade-war-2017-9.
82. See Leslie Josephs, Boeing Loses Trade Case Over Bombardier Passenger Jets, CNBC
(Jan. 26, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/26/boeing-loses-trade-case-overbombardier-passenger-jets.html.
83. See Dan Ikenson, Boeing Takes Trade Law Abuse to A Whole New Level, FORBES (Sep
14, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2017/09/14/boeing-takes-trade-lawabuse-to-a-whole-new-level/#2cc755a110a5
84. Vicki Needham, US Finalizes Hefty Duties in Bombardier-Boeing Trade Case, THE HILL
(Dec. 20, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/365915-us-finalizes-hefty-duties-inbombardier-boeing-trade-case.
85. See Gordon Rayner, et al., Theresa May Threatens U.S. with Trade War Over Bombardier
Row, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep 28, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/27/theresa-maythreatens-us-withtrade-war-bombardier-row/.
86. See Josephs, supra note 82.
87. See id.
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countries.88 However, unlike standard trade tariff systems, anti-dumping
measures are still an acceptable application of a country’s power because
they are not precluded by trade agreements.89 In light of the recent
economic struggles of the Western world and resulting protectionist
views, there seems to be no incentive for countries to subvert the trend
toward increased anti-dumping enforcement.
III. PREVALENCE OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE WORLD MARKET
Antitrust, and its proverbial little brother, antidumping, are the
subject of academic dart throwing, but no realistic alternative solution
appears to have taken their place. Legislatures seem to have accepted that
antitrust is the only option to ensure any free trade, as this paper has
suggested on numerous occasions. Each of the three major players in the
world economy—the United States, the European Union, and China—
have antitrust laws and enforce them. None show any sign of stopping.
So, the fact remains that these laws are the reality with which we must
continue to contend.
A. The United States
The U.S. has a long history of antitrust enforcement. The U.S. was
one of the first nations to adopt antitrust laws through the enactment of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts in 1890 and 1914, respectively. At that
time, it was the response to a public outcry for protection from domestic
monopolistic firms. So, at least initially, antitrust laws in the U.S. were
highly political, sitting at the forefront of public debate and playing a
large role in deciding elections.90 As time went on, the public outcry for
protection from domestic monopolistic firms turned into an outcry
against international firms.91 The U.S. antitrust system of laws gained
popularity and clout with its constituents more quickly and gained more
public awareness than similar laws in other countries.92
The U.S. system of antitrust laws then began to serve as an example
of antitrust laws abroad. Setting aside the wide reach of U.S. influence in
international matters generally, the sheer size of the U.S. market itself
made U.S. antitrust law something to learn from.

88. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 2.
89. See id.
90. WERNHARD MӦSCHEL, US VERSUS EU ANTITRUST LAW, ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zewdocs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/WernhardMoeschel.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 2.
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Although the U.S. spurred on the trend, its antitrust law is
significantly different from that of other countries in several ways. At a
high level, some distinctive features of the U.S. laws are the possibility
of criminal sanctions on bad actors, the automatic trebling of damages,
and the encouragement of private actors to bring suits.93 Today, over 75%
of antitrust cases in the U.S. are brought through private enforcement.94
These features are not common to other jurisdictions.
B. European Union
After the U.S. adopted its antitrust laws, Europeans recognized the
need for their own version of competition laws. The E.U. enacted the first
collective prohibition on competition-distorting agreements in the Treaty
of Rome in 1957.95 The E.U. has since set out its antitrust policy in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).
Despite the fact that the E.U. and the U.S. subscribe to similar legal
constructs and economic policies, major differences between the U.S. and
E.U. antitrust laws and their enforcement exist. One such difference is
that private enforcement claims are nearly nonexistent in Europe.96
Although the number of private enforcement claims are starting to
increase, they are being brought at a rate far lower than private
enforcement claims in the U.S. Virtually all antitrust litigation in the E.U.
is brought by the European Commission.97 Unlike the U.S., the E.U. did
not experience the same politicization of these issues that led to public
support and awareness at the constituent level of its general population.98
To some, the European Commission bringing most antitrust cases may
give the impression that the E.U. is more regimented and strategic about
which cases to pursue than its U.S. counterparts.
Another difference is that European competition laws do not
provide for criminal sanctions,99 or automatic treble damages for antitrust
violations.100 Again, unlike the U.S., public support for antitrust law was
weaker and less politicized in Europe. This weaker support may have
made E.U. constituents less accepting of severe consequences for bad
actors. Of course, some scholars might say that U.S. constituents are just

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2, 5.
Id. at 5.
See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 49.
See Mӧschel, supra note 90, at 5.
See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 11.
See Mӧschel, supra note 90, at 11.
See id.
See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 71.
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generally more comfortable with extreme punitive measures than their
E.U. counterparts, and antitrust law is no exception.
On a global scale, the E.U. model has displaced the U.S. model as
the international example to follow.101 Perhaps the E.U. competition laws
are perceived as more moderate, or perhaps the E.U. is just perceived as
a better example of international cooperation. As the E.U. is a trade
regime made up of many countries that have had to cooperate and
negotiate amongst themselves, the E.U. laws were already the product of
many great minds from many countries. To succeed at all, the sovereign
nations of the E.U. have had to concede on national positions in order to
form a centralized community position. The U.S. model was not subject
to multinational negotiations. On the contrary, the U.S. generally does
not make concessions during trade-related negotiations, and it is
becoming increasingly clear that the Trump Administration is especially
unwilling to make trade concessions.102 This may be a contributing factor
to the perception that the U.S. model is necessarily more extreme than its
E.U. counterparts.
Another reason for the trend toward the E.U. model may be the
perception that the U.S. seems to look more favorably on dominant firms,
especially given the reality that a large concentration of large firms were
founded in the U.S.103 The E.U. and most non-U.S. countries are thought
to be more suspicious of large and dominant firms, and therefore are
perceived to be more objective in their antitrust analysis.104 In comparison
to the U.S. model, the E.U. system has been said to have a more active
government presence, wider policy goals, and less stringent theoretical
guidelines.105
C. China
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) went into effect in 2008.106
A newcomer to the area of antitrust, China’s “core provisions of the AML
were modeled largely on E.U. competition law and, to a lesser extent, on

101. Bo James Howell, Antitrust Law: Resisting Modern Protectionism in a Global Recession,
13 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (2010).
102. See Shawn Donnan, U.S. Anti-Dumping Cases Fueled by Trump Trade Threats, FIN.
TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fc84be52-31d5-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Steven C. Sunshine, et al., Antitrust: The Rising Tide, in 2009 INSIGHTS: NAVIGATING
TUMULTUOUS TIMES 72 (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates et al., eds
2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2009_insights.pdf.
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the laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries.” 107
On its face, the law appears neutral; “[i]t subjects foreign and domestic
corporations to anti-trust scrutiny” and “promote[s] economic efficiency”
as its policy motive.108 However, the Chinese law is different from the
U.S. and the E.U. laws in that it widely reserves the government’s right
to reject foreign acquisitions because of national security concerns; these
concerns are both national and “economic” ones.109
To be fair, other countries, including the U.S. and E.U., reserve this
right as well.110 However, scholars say that the scope of China’s “national
security” concerns is much broader than the interpretations of other
countries.111 China’s antitrust laws, unlike the E.U. and U.S., are not
primarily enacted to promote market efficiency. Instead, there is a focus
on national economic security, which serves to protect “‘strategic and
sensitive’ industries and Chinese national champions.”112 China’s
leadership has long feared “that Western critics ‘aim to change [China’s]
economic infrastructure and weaken the government’s control of the
national economy.’”113 So, the leadership has gone to great lengths to
avoid these changes.
China’s political system does not share the same Western
democracy and rules of law as the U.S. and the E.U.114 Further, China
does not share the same economic ideology of the U.S. and E.U.
protectionism. “Market manipulation” is not a dirty phrase with negative
connotations in China. By virtue of China’s communist system, its
government bodies are expected to intervene and insulate the country in
ways that Western capitalists would not. Unlike the U.S., China’s people
have not been trained to trust a “market” but a government.
107. International Antitrust Enforcement: China and Beyond: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
59 (2016) [hereinafter International Antitrust Enforcement Hearing] (statement of Prof. Thomas J.
Horton, Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota
School of Law).
108. Anu Bradford, Chinese Antitrust Law: The New Face of Protectionism?, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/anu-bradford/chinese-antitrust-lawthe_b_116422.html.
109. Id.
110. See Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/foreign-investment-and-us-national-security (last
updated Aug. 28, 2018).
111. Thomas J. Horton, Antitrust or Industrial Protectionism?: Emerging International Issues
in China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 109, 125-126
(2016).
112. Id. at 124.
113. See International Antitrust Enforcement Hearing, supra note 107, at 64 (statement of Prof.
Thomas J. Horton).
114. See id. at 66.
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It is likely that Chinese antitrust laws will never mimic any Western
economic view of free markets.115 Setting political systems aside, the
Eastern world’s concept of free trade is more concerned with notions of
fairness between nations.116 This may explain why China places
significantly high strategic value on not becoming overly dependent on
imports. Conversely, the Western view of free trade, at least in theory,
does not concern itself with national fairness or import dependency as
much as it does with global market efficiency.
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Despite the strong propensity towards the adoption of antitrust laws
at the national level, countries appear to have generally abandoned all
hope for an international body of antitrust enforcement.117 The U.S.
continues to withhold support for internationalization, and its lack of
support has proven to be quite persuasive to members of international
cooperative efforts.
A. Failed Attempts at Establishing an International Body of Antitrust
Governance or Harmonization
Formal international competition law attempts have failed, in large
part, due to lack of support from the U.S.118 The first attempt was
commissioned by the League of Nations, which explored whether an
international system against cartel arrangements was within the realm of
possibility.119 At the time, “Europeans looked at cartel arrangements as
an attempt to preserve economic stability,” and the reports praised some
cartels as “instruments of peace, international cooperation, and
prosperity.”120 As a result, the League did not adopt any measures against
cartel activity, citing the greater good.
After World War II, it was again argued that there was a need for
international governing authority over antitrust enforcement.121 World
leaders and lawmakers sought a new, more cooperative world and
discussed competition laws during the proposed International Trade
Organization (“ITO”) Havana Charter in 1947.122 The notes from those
115. Id. at 78.
116. See GILPIN, supra note 10, at 391.
117. See generally Howell, supra note 101.
118. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 1242.
119. Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.L. REV.
343, 349 (1997).
120. Id. at 349-50.
121. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 1239-40.
122. See Waller, supra note 119, at 350.
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discussions contained “detailed rules regarding the substance and
enforcement of competition law,”123 indicating that it was heavily debated
and discussed, but ultimately no competition rules were decided upon.124
The U.S. was among those countries which refused to ratify the
contemplated competition rules.125
Shortly after the Havana Charter, nations enacted the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).126 The GATT, like the
agreements that came before it, remained silent on international
competition rules.127 This repeated failure to address international
competition rules in international trade agreements suggests that
centralized international competition laws may be a non-starter for years
to come.
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in 1995
and is the closest entity to a central authority on international trade laws,
despite the fact that no centralized law exists.128 Again, the Doha
Ministerial attempted to negotiate international competition rules and
introduce them into the established authority of the WTO.129 By 2004,
during the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the plans to adopt
competition laws were foiled.130 Developing countries and the U.S. did
not provide their support for the introduction of competition laws.131
As a result, although the WTO was established to be a primary
venue to litigate antitrust matters between countries, the WTO can argue
only that a country unfairly applied their own country’s domestic laws.132
There is still no international set of laws promulgated by the WTO. Given
that discrepancies exist even between the three major trade countries, the
lack of internationally set authority is quite limiting.
Given these historically failed and haphazard attempts, it is not
likely that a uniform antitrust law can be adopted globally. China, the
U.S., and the E.U. all subscribe to varying versions of free trade and what
constitutes an appropriate method of enforcement. Further still, the
national values significantly differ between these countries. In China,
123. Id.
124. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 1240.
125. See Waller, supra note 119, at 350.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See generally About WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2018).
129. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 1240.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. What is the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatwedoe.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2018).
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national security terms and the promotion of national industry is
paramount.133 Similarly, the U.S., while not allowing for the same breadth
of application as China in its national security terms, seems determined
to preserve its domestic laws despite the clear preference of other nations
for E.U. competition laws.134
B. Informal Harmonization and Cooperation
Efforts to informally harmonize international competition laws have
continued despite the failure of formal international laws. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”) each adopted codes that outlined negotiations and agreed
to competition law principles.135 The codes were completely informal and
non-binding.136 Although the OECD’s latest recommendations for
antitrust cooperation were revised relatively recently in 1995, the
agreement is still a “law . . . of the softest variety.”137 This is in part
because Western industrialized nations seek to address anticompetitive
behavior, while the burgeoning countries are more concerned with
promoting economic development and regulating multinational
corporations.138
The International Competition Network (“ICN”) is another
institution that encourages cooperative action on antitrust principles. 139
However, the ICN, much like other informal networks, does nothing to
limit or minimize the protectionist behaviors of countries, which is
common in the face of uncertainty and lack of consensus on topics such
as antitrust.140
Lack of enforceability aside, these negotiations and cooperative
efforts “established a framework that has been reasonably successful and
has set the stage for more binding commitments on a bilateral basis.” 141
The fact of the matter is that there is no economic model that is globally
or unanimously accepted by all nation-states, so there can be no truly
successful global harmonization.142 To internationalize the law, even in
133. See Bradford, supra note 108.
134. Cremieux & Snyder, supra note 18, at 778.
135. Waller, supra note 119, at 350-51.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 361-62.
138. See id. at 351.
139. See Howell, supra note 101, at 6.
140. See id.
141. Waller, supra note 119, at 362.
142. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, WORKING DRAFT (Sept. 1, 1991),
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an informal capacity, would require the policy behind the laws to be
agreed upon.143 How can one agree to perfect and protect an economic
policy that is not itself uniform amongst all nations? 144
C. Regional and Bi-lateral Treaties
In addition to informal harmonization efforts, certain regional and
bilateral treaties have been put in place to encourage cooperation on
antitrust enforcement.145 In 1991, the U.S. and E.U. entered into a
cooperative antitrust agreement.146 Other nations have also entered into
antitrust cooperation agreements.147 These agreements are not
harmonized, vary widely, and contain different levels of required
cooperation.148 Yet, they are a country’s best bet for solidifying any kind
of binding cooperation with another country on antitrust laws.
V. CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE AND RISING PROTECTIONISM RHETORIC
Our current political climate reveals a return to protectionist rhetoric
and policies. Today, the bulk of protectionism is accomplished through
non-tariff barriers, such as domestic content legislation and other
restrictive measures.149 Antitrust is another one of these measures that
will, at least for the foreseeable future, be a growing and pivotal force on
the world stage.
A. Perception of Unfair Enforcement
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a widespread perception
that domestic countries unfairly apply antitrust laws to foreign firms
through “unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market
conditions” for their domestic industries and firms.150 A systematic bias
against foreign companies would thwart the goal of antitrust and
undermine countries’ cooperative efforts. 151 In nearly equal measure, the

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/report_1991_full_rep
ort.authcheckdam.pdf.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 142, at 279.
146. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 1226.
147. See id. at 1239.
148. See id.
149. GILPIN, supra note 10, at 204.
150. Horton, supra note 111, at 139.
151. See Bradford et al., supra note 3, at 8.
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E.U., U.S., and China have been the accused and the accuser of claims of
unfair antitrust enforcement.152
In the Western markets, China is said to have been discriminatory
in its application of antitrust law to foreign businesses. 153 Even after the
enactment of its antitrust laws, the consensus by scholars has been that
China is focused on protecting its own domestic companies and
industries, and the law is used to create a barrier to entry for foreign
firms.154 Through the AML national security language, China has
expressed and codified its perceived interest in avoiding adverse impacts
to its domestic small and medium-sized enterprises and has rejected the
“survival of the fittest, markets will self-correct inefficiencies” economic
theories shared by most Western countries.155
Not surprisingly, some of the strongest criticism of China has come
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.156 It claims that China is using
AML to “advance policy and boost national champions . . . [through]
systemic, officially sanctioned curtailment” of rights afforded under the
laws.157 Further, the Chamber adds that “all transactions blocked or
conditionally approved to date have involved foreign companies.” 158
Generally, “foreign companies have well-founded concerns about how
. . . China’s legal framework for antitrust enforcement provides
opportunities for protectionism and industrial policy to sway
decisions.”159 Companies and countries alike considered China’s AML to
be a “newer, subtler form of protectionism, one cloaked in regulatory
impartiality but intended primarily to promote Chinese companies,
especially the big, powerful, state-owned companies.”160
Although the U.S. appears to be quick to make these allegations, it
is not immune from being on the receiving end of similar charges.161 The
U.S. has also attempted to preserve its own “economically important
industries which are threatened by import competition” through
protectionism on many occasions, though perhaps with more subtlety
152. See Horton, supra note 111, at 140.
153. See id. at 135.
154. See id. at 115.
155. Id. at 128-130.
156. See id. at 138.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Neil Gough, Chris Buckley & Nick Wingfield, China’s Energetic Enforcement of
Antitrust
Rules
Alarms
Foreign
Firms,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/business/international/china8217s-energetic-enforcementof-antitrust-rules-alarms-foreign-firms.html.
161. See generally Plummer, supra note 2.
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than China.162 Some academics observe that the U.S. appears to be “less
keen to go after its own monopolies, although [the U.S.] appears to have
no problem going after foreign ones.”163
Even the E.U., who is often considered to be the most moderate of
the three, is not immune. High ranking U.S. officials “accused the E.U.
of bias against U.S. companies.”164 Even then-President Barack Obama
suggested that the E.U. was engaging in protectionism.165
The oddity here is that these perceptions of misapplication of the
law have been proven to be unfounded, at least in the E.U. An empirical
study of over 5,000 cases from 1990 to 2014 evaluated the E.U.’s
enforcement of antitrust laws on foreign and domestic merger activity. 166
They concluded that the E.U. is less likely to challenge a U.S. or foreign
acquirer, a fact in direct opposition to what the U.S. has claimed.167
Rather, the E.U. appears to apply more stringent guidelines to its
domestic E.U. members.168 The study concluded that while the E.U. has
engaged in extraterritorial enforcement of its own laws, it has been more
cautious to do so than the U.S.169 Whether that will change considering
the recent political climate has yet to be tested. Further, only time will tell
whether similar studies will be conducted and reveal similar conclusions
as to the U.S. and China’s enforcement of antitrust laws.
The fact remains that all countries have nationalist policies. Where
antitrust laws support the welfare enhancing goals of a country or its
constituents, it makes sense that national leaders will gladly enforce those
antitrust laws.170 The question becomes, what happens when the
enforcement of the law results in less favorable conditions for a nation’s
constituents? At least in perception, any sensitivity to its national
constituents will seem like a misapplication of the law. 171 As long as
nations have priorities that are inherently at odds with some other nations’
adopted economic policies, there is a risk of a perception of unfair
enforcement.172
162. Gifford, supra note 15, at 1074.
163. Howell, supra note 101, at 9.
164. Suzanne Lynch, EU’s Google Ruling Cranks Up Tension With Big US Firms, IRISH TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eu-s-google-ruling-cranks-uptension-with-big-us-firms-1.2618020.
165. See id.
166. Bradford et al., supra note 3, at 3.
167. See id. at 24.
168. See id. at 8.
169. See Bradford et al., supra note 3, at 1; Waller, supra note 119, at 380.
170. See Gifford, supra note 15, at 1065.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1092.
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B. Outcry for Protectionism, Generally
Given the lingering effects of the recent global recession, “the cry
for protectionist policies is louder than it has been for decades.” 173 No
longer are political leaders “willing to subordinate [their] short-term
economic interests to long-term interests and to the larger good of the
international economy.”174 Articles far and wide seem to suggest the same
thing: the E.U. and U.S. populations are hearing about protectionism as a
far more familiar and welcomed concept as of late.175
The above-referenced articles, like many published before and
since, demonstrate a sentiment felt by many observing the international
political scene. There has been a staunch rise of populist and protectionist
rhetoric from many nations. In addition, we know from the history of the
enactment of U.S. antitrust laws that strong political support from the
masses can create strong effects in republic-based political
environments.176 Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, this
protectionist rhetoric has changed the political backdrop against which
antitrust laws are and will be bred and enforced in the near term.
C. The United States, Donald Trump, and Making America Great Again
Trump has been long perceived to carry a protectionist agenda.
Although not an “isolationist,” an extreme version of protectionism that
very few would expect an international business mogul to have, Trump
has openly and proudly stated that his focus is on “America First.” 177 He
made countless speeches during his election and since obtaining office
that have repeated “the idea that America is being taken advantage of by
other countries and the assertion that trade deals and immigration have
destroyed jobs and fueled crime.”178 His message has reached the masses
of the American and international populations.179 His own campaign
slogan, “Make America Great Again,” cements a message, even to
173. Howell, supra note 101, at 9.
174. GILPIN, supra note 10, at 365.
175. See generally Daniel Ben-Ami, World Trade: Is Protectionism On The Rise?, IPE (Feb.
2017), https://www.ipe.com/investment/briefing-investment/world-trade-is-protectionism-on-therise/10017403.article.
176. Orbach, supra note 29, at 2266.
177. See Krishnadev Calamur, A Short History of ‘America First’, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 21,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-america-first/514037/.
178. Dan De Luce, Trump Sticks to a Protectionist, Isolationist Script in First Big Speech,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:58 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/trump-sticks-toa-protectionist-isolationist-script-in-first-big-speech/.
179. See id. See generally Don Lee, Trump Wants To Cut Bilateral Trade Deals, But What If
Nobody Comes To The Table?, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2017, 1:40 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-trade-strategy-20170526-story.html#.
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individuals unschooled in antitrust doctrine or other generally accepted
economic theories, that Trump, a celebrated businessman, finds there is
an imbalance in the way America had been participating in world trade.
Trump’s actions so far are nearly as strong as his rhetoric. In
attempts to further free trade, he has worked toward “getting rid of the
foreign market access borders that often shut out American goods and
services, and having stronger enforcement of our trade agreements.” 180
Despite those actions however, he has also continued to criticize former
leaders for the current trade agreements in place or those potential
agreements negotiated between the U.S. and various countries around the
world, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership.181 Further, he has made it
clear that tariffs are not something he is afraid to implement.182
Trump is clearly supporting protectionism through his actions and
rhetoric, a choice that reverberates as a war cry through the heart of proworld trade economists. His statements have fueled several articles
warning that Trump’s protectionism is perhaps the greatest threat to “the
system of rules and regulations that has governed world trade for
decades.”183 Will that come to fruition? Considering his recent tariff
decisions, it may.184
D. Brexit and Le Pen in the (former) E.U.
Trump is not alone in his protectionist sentiments. In March of 2017,
the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) served notice terminating its participation
in the E.U.185 While trade relations are only a small part of that which the
E.U. negotiated on behalf of its members, Brexit still broadly represents
the U.K.’s rejection of steps toward economic integration in favor of
making its own decisions on trade.186 Clearly, this decision was the result
of the U.K.’s protectionist aims. Leading up to the U.K.’s vote to leave
the E.U. and since, articles conveying protectionist viewpoints have been
on the rise. For example, it was suggested that coordination within the
E.U. unnecessarily limited the U.K.’s freedom to run their country:

180. Sean Hackbarth, What Has President Trump Done So Far On Trade?, U.S. CHAMBER
COM. (May 11, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/what-has-presidenttrump-done-so-far-trade.
181. See Lee, supra note 179.
182. Kasperowicz, supra note 4, at 2.
183. Ben-Ami, supra note 175.
184. Kasperowicz, supra note 4, at 2.
185. Peter Willis & Richard Eccles, Brexit: Competition Law Implications, BIRD & BIRD (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/competition-law-implications-of-abrexit.
186. Ben-Ami, supra note 175.
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By withdrawing from the EU, we can organize economic and social
affairs in this country not by deliberate design from the top down, but
more organically and spontaneously . . . It’s because we know in our
bones that it is a daft way to run a whole continent. I suspect it is not only
the Brits who will soon be demanding the freedom to opt out.187
By some, coordination with the E.U.’s efforts were perceived as
eliminating the power of the U.K. altogether:
And this is the thing with the EU. Once consent is established for
the basic foundation, the ossification process begins to the point where
you no longer have the power, reform is impossible and like trade and
agriculture, it simply drops out of public discourse. Why debate that
which cannot be influenced? This is how we drift from democracy to
technocracy—and subsequently stagnation and disaffection. That is why
I would vote to leave every single time.188
Supporters even grew concerned that all of the E.U. nations had lost
their ability to function separate from the E.U.:
The EU has become too economically and politically integrated for
its member states to function as truly independent nations.189
Whether this type of rhetoric will result in further political actions
toward protectionism within the U.K.’s borders, or was just intended to
encourage British citizens to vote for Brexit, enough of the population
seemed to agree by way of a popular vote for Brexit that its parliamentary
body could manage its own economic affairs just fine without the E.U.
playing a role.
On the mainland, other E.U. nations seem affected by a rise in
protectionist rhetoric. Marine Le Pen, a French politician, led an—albeit
unsuccessful—campaign for the presidency of France, in which she
called for “smart protectionism,” introducing the term into the living
rooms of the population.190 Whether an effective strategy or not, she
garnered support from “ordinary middle-class French people” in part
because “protectionism sounds like common-sense economics” as well
as a job creation plan.191 The accepted and long-term effects of such a
potential economic plan were not discussed as much as the rhetoric,
187. 7 Reasons Why We Should Leave The Eu, CAMPAIGN FOR INDEP. BRITAIN,
http://campaignforanindependentbritain.org.uk/the-economy/. (last visited Sept 7, 2018).
188. Best Be Leaving Now, CAMPAIGN FOR INDEP. BRITAIN, https://campaignfor
anindependentbritain.org.uk/tag/trade-bloc/ (last visited Sept 15, 2018).
189. Timothy B. Lee, The Brexit Vote is a Symptom of Larger Problems With the European
Union, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2016/2/25/11110592/brexit-britain-vote-explained (last
updated June 22, 2016, 3:50 PM).
190. See Bill Wirtz, Le Pen is Stoking France’s Passion For Protectionism, CAPX (Feb. 16,
2017), https://capx.co/le-pen-is-stoking-frances-passion-for-protectionism/.
191. Id.
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which proudly touted: “we need protectionism.”192 Although Le Pen was
not ultimately elected, she brought to the limelight a sentiment of
protectionism and garnered political support for it, which set the stage for
the far-right protectionism that seems to be sweeping the politics of other
E.U. countries.
E. General Protectionist Sentiment on the Rise
Although the above represent a few admittedly cherry-picked
examples of growing protectionism, the WTO has reported that there has
been a “surge in antitrade rhetoric around the world . . . being
accompanied by a rise in the introduction of protectionist measures by
the world’s leading economies.”193 Between October of 2015 and May of
2016, the major world economies “introduced new protectionist trade
measures at the fastest pace seen since the 2008 financial crisis, rolling
out the equivalent of five each week.”194
The WTO’s warning was intended to raise awareness that the
creeping protectionism of the 1930s may be rearing its ugly head yet
again, with the intention of preparing world leaders to avoid the pitfalls
of such an approach.195 With so many agreements in place that are
designed to prevent countries from raising tariff levels and engaging in
the policies which plagued the world economy during the Great
Depression, it makes sense that individual countries may fall back to
antitrust law as a lever to promote protectionist policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a clear “conflict between the evolving economic and
technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing
compartmentalization of the world political system composed of
sovereign states . . . .”196 This conflict can breed protectionist political
views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from
protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the
“rational” assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency.
Some amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although “inefficient”
in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign
powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free
192. Id.
193. Shawn Donnan, WTO Warns On Rise Of Protectionist Measures By G20 Economics, FIN.
TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2dd0ecc4-3768-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See GILPIN, supra note 10, at 11.
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trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether
protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction
that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be
wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will
affect the international trade landscape in the near term.
While attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of
the web of international trade agreements currently in existence,
individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet
protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative
body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about
preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic
economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through
regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether.
Antitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be
effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as
promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at
risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by
perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world
leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already
delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free
trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric
fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be
manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly
likely to become a nail in free trade’s coffin, instead of the key to its
preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake
of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit
of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear:
anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic
community significantly for years to come.

